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National Culture and Earnings Management in Developed and 
Emerging Countries 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study investigates how the association between national culture and earnings 
management compares between developed and emerging countries. 
Design/methodology/approach – The empirical analysis relies on a sample of 6,313 firm-year 
observations from 11 emerging markets and 27,605 firm-year observations from 22 developed 
countries. We use Ordinary Least Squares regression methods to test the hypotheses of the 
study. 
Findings – Based on Hofstede’s (2011) cultural dimensions, we find that firms from countries 
with a higher level of uncertainty avoidance and individualism are less likely to engage in 
earnings management, but the effect of uncertainty avoidance (individualism) is more (less) 
pronounced in the emerging countries. Moreover, we demonstrate that firms from emerging 
(developed) countries with higher levels of power distance and masculinity are less (more) 
likely to engage in earnings management. Finally, we find evidence of a trade-off between 
accruals-based and real earnings management in firms from countries with greater long-term 
orientation and an indulgence cultural dimension. 
Originality – This paper adds to the literature by theoretically discussing and empirically 
analysing the role that developed and emerging countries’ development plays on the effect of 
national culture on earnings management. 
Keywords – National culture, Earnings management, Emerging and developed countries. 
 
1 Introduction 
This study investigates how the association between national culture and earnings management 
compares between developed and emerging countries. More specifically, we investigate 
whether Hofstede’s (2011) cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power 
distance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence) are associated with the degree of 
firm-level earnings management, and whether this association differs between firms from 
developed and emerging countries. 
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Prior literature provides convincing arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that 
there is an influence of national culture on accounting practices. In a broad way, given that 
countries’ cultural values permeate a nation’s social system, it may then be hypothesized that 
there should be a close match between national culture and patterns of accounting systems 
internationally (Gray, 1988). Therefore, cultural values at country-level can affect a variety of 
decisions related to accounting choices, including those regarding earnings discretion (Guan et 
al., 2005). Empirical research provides evidence on the association between national cultural 
factors and the extent of earnings management at the firm level (Paredes and Wheatley, 2017; 
Gray et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2011; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010; 
Han et al., 2010). 
In general, the studies cited above take into account Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and 
indulgence as measures of the national culture of each country. Nevertheless, most of these 
studies are focused only on developed countries, or at least on samples composed 
predominantly of firms from developed countries, and they report mixed empirical findings. 
For instance, while Gray et al. (2015) suggest a significant negative (positive) association 
between countries’ uncertainty avoidance (power distance) and earnings management, Riahi 
and Omri (2013) demonstrate the opposite. A possible explanation for these conflicting 
findings may be the differences in the economic and institutional environment of the countries 
under analysis. For example, Gray et al. (2015) analysed a sample composed of 14 developed 
(European Union) countries, while Riahi and Omri (2013) analysed two developed countries, 
France and Canada, and Tunisia, a developing country. We add to this literature by analysing 
whether the association between national culture and earnings management differs between 
firms from developed and emerging countries. 
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Several characteristics distinguish developed and emerging markets. In broad terms, 
developed countries afford greater investor protection and financial markets development 
(DeFond et al., 2007) and more ambitious enforcement (Preiato et al., 2015; Brown et al., 
2014). On the other hand, emerging countries are characterized by a weaker information 
environment (Shroff et al., 2014) and by “institutional voids” whereby firms must respond to 
unpredictable (but frequent) shocks – political instability, aggressive macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and even wars – without the benefit of specialized intermediaries that can analyse 
market information, facilitate transactions, or provide signals related to credibility (Gao et al., 
2017). The differences in the economic and institutional characteristics of developed and 
emerging countries are often mentioned in the literature as determinants of the differences 
between the quality of accounting information of firms from these two groups of countries 
(emerging and developed). In fact, the literature provides evidence that the factors that 
distinguish developed and emerging markets may influence the incentives of managers to 
provide useful financial information (Pinkowitz et al., 2003; Lin and Wu, 2014; Flores et al., 
2016; Lourenço et al., 2018; Zaini et al., 2018). We develop a set of hypotheses on the 
association between national culture and earnings management, considering a potentially 
different effect in emerging countries when compared to developed countries. 
The empirical study relies on a sample comprising 6,313 firm-year observations from 
11 emerging markets and 27,605 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries. In our 
main analysis, earnings management is a dependent variable, and our independent variables 
include the characteristics of the national culture of the respective countries analysed. These 
independent variables are based on the six cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2011), 
a highly influential national cultural classification (Kirkman et al., 2006). Hofstede provides a 
wide database that allows an empirical analysis of cultural values for a wide range of countries. 
A vast literature on the association between cultural factors and earnings management draws 
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upon Hofstede’s national culture classification, and this allows us to compare our findings with 
those reported in previous literature. 
Overall, we find that firms from countries with a higher level of uncertainty avoidance 
and individualism are less likely to engage in earnings management, but the effect of 
uncertainty avoidance (individualism) is more (less) pronounced in emerging countries. Our 
findings also show that firms from emerging (developed) countries with higher levels of power 
distance and masculinity are less (more) likely to engage in earnings management. In addition, 
we find that firms from countries with greater long-term orientation (indulgence) are more 
(less) likely to engage in accruals-based earnings management, at the expense of a decrease 
(increase) in the level of real earnings management, but the association between indulgence 
and earnings management is observable only in the developed countries. Our results remain 
the same as when we consider alternative earnings management measures, the joint effect of 
culture with enforcement and with corruption, and when we account for time-period and 
econometric variations. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend previous studies 
on the association between national culture and earnings management by providing theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings concerning differences in the association between national 
culture and earnings management in developed and emerging countries – which to the best of 
our knowledge has not yet been specifically addressed. As we demonstrate in our literature 
review, the majority of previous studies on national culture and earnings management seems 
to focus only on developed countries (e.g., Gray et al., 2015), or at least samples assembled 
predominantly from developed economies (e.g., Paredes and Wheatley, 2017; Zhang et al., 
2013) – the latter without addressing the role that countries’ economic development plays on 
the association between national culture and firm-level earnings management tactics. We argue 
and show empirically that differences in the economic and institutional characteristics between 
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developed and emerging countries impact the way cultural factors affect the incentives of 
managers to engage in earnings management practices.  
Second, we add to the international accounting literature focused on finding differences 
in the incentives of managers from developed and emerging countries to provide useful 
accounting information. Some studies show empirically that the incentives of managers to 
engage in earnings management practices differ between emerging and developed countries 
(e.g., Lin and Wu, 2014; Flores et al., 2016; Lourenço et al., 2018). We demonstrate that 
national cultural factors influence these incentives differently in emerging and developed 
countries. 
Finally, we complement the empirical evidence on the association between national 
culture and earnings management by considering two of Hofstede’s (2011) national cultural 
dimensions that are less explored in previous literature: long-term orientation and indulgence. 
Apparently, only Gray et al. (2015) provide empirical findings concerning the association 
between Hofstede’s long-term orientation dimension and firm-level earnings management 
strategy, and none of the previous studies seems to address the role of Hofstede’s indulgence 
dimension on this association. 
Our empirical findings also contribute to an important debate among investors, standard 
setters, regulators, and other stakeholders on how earnings management strategies differ 
between emerging and developed countries. By demonstrating how the effect of culture on the 
quality of the financial reports (i.e., earnings management) differs between developed and 
emerging countries, we provide an important discussion for standard setters and regulators who 
must take into account the role of institutional and economic characteristics simultaneously in 
the development of accounting standards and monitoring firm strategies. Similarly, 
international investors and analysts should be aware of these characteristics when dealing with 
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accounting information provided by firms from different countries (e.g., emerging versus 
developed countries). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous 
literature and presents the hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design, 
data, and sample selection procedure. Sections 4 and 5 present the results and discussion, as 
well as robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article. 
 
2 Background 
Financial reporting is viewed as a key determinant of the efficiency of resource-allocation 
decisions and economic growth (Bushman et al., 2004). The quality of financial reporting is 
thus a key issue in improving, for instance, investment efficiency by mitigating the information 
asymmetry between corporate managers and capital suppliers, allowing firms to better attract 
capital from investors and mitigate underinvestment problems (Zhong, 2018). 
Therefore, regulators have been paying attention to financial reporting quality and, 
more specifically, to accounting fraud and earnings manipulation tactics. Notwithstanding this, 
notarial scandals such as the Enron and WorldCom cases in the US, the Petrobras and 
Odebrecht scandals originated by the Operation CarWash (an ongoing criminal investigation) 
of the Federal Police of Brazil, or even the Toshiba incident in Japan, show that managers have 
been able to rely on accounting choices to distort the reality of economic facts and serve their 
self-interests to the detriment of others. Although the concept of earnings management per se 
does not necessarily involve fraud, there is a consensus among academics and practitioners that 
high levels of earnings management can be classified as fraud. Around the world, local 
regulatory bodies continually strive to avoid the abusive practice of earnings management by 
firms’ managers, but some accounting scandals and even corporate failings have eroded the 
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public trust on accounting and reporting practices and, consequently, in the effectiveness of 
these regulatory bodies. 
Given the increasing market globalization and consequently the high levels of cross-
listing, the efforts to avoid earnings management became of international nature. Some 
international regulatory bodies have taken actions to guarantee that firms provide high-quality 
accounting information, irrespective of the country location. For example, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority, the European Union’s securities markets regulator, issues 
regularly guidelines to achieve supervisory convergence in the European Union.  
The International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation has also been making 
efforts to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable, and globally accepted financial reporting standards, which should require high 
quality, transparent, and comparable information in financial statements to help investors, other 
participants in the world’s capital markets, and other users of financial information when 
making economic decisions. A majority of countries around the world have adopted these 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which have been seen as a way of 
increasing the quality of accounting information worldwide (Barth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 
2010) and promoting an improvement of the efficiency of the capital markets at an international 
level (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010).  
However, despite all these efforts, there are still some significant differences in how 
each country has applied the IFRS (Kvaal and Nobes, 2010, 2012; Nobes, 2011). The expected 
improvement in the capital markets seem to be highly dependent on the level of enforcement 
of the accounting standards in each country (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010). Previous literature 
shows that, even in the IFRS era, there are significant differences in the level of earnings 
management of firms from different countries, namely between developed and emerging 
countries (e.g., Lin and Wu, 2014; Flores et al., 2016; Lourenço et al., 2018). It seems that 
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firms from emerging countries have different incentives to manage earnings when compared 
to firms from developed countries, which should be taken into account by national and 
international standard setters and regulators when making policy decisions. We aim to 
contribute to this debate by analysing whether the national culture of each country influences 
the managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management practices differently in emerging 
and in developed countries. 
 
3 Theory, Empirical Literature, and Hypotheses Development 
Previous literature consistently provides empirical evidence on the role of national culture as a 
key determinant of several issues linked to firms’ financial reports, such as accounting 
conservatism (Wronski and Klann, 2020; Salter et al., 2013), voluntary disclosure (Adnan et 
al., 2018; Luo, and Tang, 2016), financial statement comparability (Prescott and Vann, 2015), 
meet-or-beat earnings benchmarks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011), and auditing and reporting 
standards (Karaibrahimoglu and Cangarli, 2016). There is also some evidence on the effect of 
national culture on earnings management strategies (Paredes and Wheatley, 2017; Gray et al., 
2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2011; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010; Han et al., 
2010). 
This previous evidence, overall, is in line with the explanations of Gray’s (1988) theory 
of accounting values. According to this theory, “cultural characteristics shared across a country 
or a society lead to shared accounting values that influence the nation’s accounting system” 
(El-Helaly et al., 2020, p. 4). Thus, Gray’s (1988) seminal paper lays out an important 
theoretical framework on the effect of national culture on accounting practices, taking into 
account Hofstede’s (1980, 2011) cultural dimensions. 
Hofstede’s framework (Hofstede, 1980, 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010) defines culture as 
a collective mental programming that distinguishes members of one group or category of 
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people from others. Based on more than 117,000 IBM employees and considering their 
responses to 32 value statements between 1967-1969, Hofstede’s (1980) pioneering work 
defines four cultural dimensions that, according to Desender et al. (2011), remain at the heart 
of much cultural research: individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
masculinity. More recently, in a process of expanding these concepts, Hofstede et al. (2010) 
and Hofstede (2011) formally point out two more important national cultural dimensions, based 
on more recent data and covering more economies: long-term orientation and indulgence. 
Commonly based on Gray’s (1988) theory of accounting values, and also discussing 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, previous literature has empirically analysed the consequences 
of differences between countries’ national culture on earnings quality, specifically on earnings 
manipulation levels by managers. Table I shows the samples analysed and the main results of 
these studies.  
 
(Insert Table I here) 
 
Most of these studies are focused only on developed countries, or at least on samples 
composed predominantly by firms from developed countries – the latter without addressing the 
role that countries’ economic development plays in the association between national culture 
and earnings management. Additionally, these studies report mixed empirical findings. For 
instance, while Paredes and Wheatley (2017) and Gray et al. (2015) suggest a significant 
negative (positive) association between countries’ uncertainty avoidance (power distance) and 
earnings management, Riahi and Omri (2013) demonstrate the opposite. Additionally, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) find a significant negative (positive) association between countries’ 
uncertainty avoidance (individualism) and earnings management, and Callen et al. (2011) find 
an opposite association. A possible explanation for these conflicting findings may be the 
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differences in the economic and institutional environment of the countries under analysis. For 
example, Gray et al. (2015) analysed a sample composed of 14 developed European Union 
countries, while Riahi and Omri (2013) analysed two developed countries, France and Canada, 
and one developing country, Tunisia. 
Additionally, almost all of the studies presented in Table I analyse the effect of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and individualism on earnings 
management, but few studies analyse the effect of the dimensions of power distance, 
masculinity, and long-term orientation, and none of the studies investigates the effect of the 
cultural dimension of indulgence. 
We add to this literature by providing theoretical arguments and empirical findings 
concerning how the association between national culture and earnings management differs 
between firms from developed and emerging countries – which to the best of our knowledge 
has not been specifically investigated in previous research. Moreover, we complement the 
literature by analysing two national cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2011) that are less 
explored, i.e., long-term orientation and indulgence. By analysing all six of Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, we also offer a broader view on the effect of national culture on earnings 
management. 
Several characteristics distinguish developed and emerging markets. Developed 
countries generally present higher levels of financial innovation (Hsu et al., 2014), lower levels 
of economic and social inequality1, greater investor protection and financial markets 
development (DeFond et al., 2007), and enforcement that is more ambitious (see e.g., Preiato 
et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2014). On the other hand, emerging markets are characterized by 
lower levels of international experience and exposure, and weaker corporate governance 
systems and government regulation (Bhagat et al., 2011). Moreover, emerging countries are 
 
1 See, e.g., Human Development Report, United Nations, 2019. Full report: http://hdr.undp.org/en/2019-report/download 
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also characterized by lower levels of monitoring by shareholders and protection of minority 
investors (Djankov et al., 2008), higher-risk markets for lending purposes (Ballester and 
González-Urteaga, 2017), and lower levels of litigation risk (Arthur et al., 2015). Less 
developed countries are also characterized by greater ownership concentration and the presence 
of family-owned firms (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) compared with developed economies. 
These characteristics that distinguish developed and emerging markets may influence 
the incentives of managers to provide useful financial information. Pinkowitz et al. (2003), for 
instance, argue that managers make different decisions in countries with poor protection of 
investor rights and poor financial development. Previous accounting literature has shown 
differences in the factors explaining earnings management practices in developed countries 
compared to emerging countries. Lin and Wu’s (2014) findings suggest that corporate 
governance regulations play an important role in reducing the earnings-manipulation 
behaviour, and that this phenomenon seems to be greater in developed than in emerging 
markets. Flores et al. (2016) also identify different implications of the subprime crisis on 
earnings management practices when comparing empirical results based on companies from a 
developed and an emerging economy. Lourenço et al. (2018) find that higher levels of 
corruption perception are associated with a higher level of earnings management in emerging 
countries but not in developed countries. We extend this literature by examining how the 
association between national cultural dimensions and earnings management compares between 
developed and emerging countries. 
3.1 Uncertainty avoidance 
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance dimension refers to the extent to which the members of a 
society feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations, expressed through nervous stress 
and a need for predictability, among other manifestations (Hofstede et al., 2010). Strong 
uncertainty avoidance societies maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant 
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of deviant persons and ideas. Weak uncertainty avoidance societies maintain a more relaxed 
atmosphere in which practice counts more than principles and deviance is more easily tolerated. 
Countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance usually are more likely to rely on 
accounting uniformity, with a need for detailed rules and regulation and respect for conformity, 
and to be associated with an accounting profession that is subject to public statutory control, 
with limited self-governance (Gray, 1988). Thus, uncertainty avoidant societies are inclined to 
allow fewer chances and incentives for earnings manipulation practices (Gray et al., 2015).  
Another stream of literature, supported on the gender socialization theory, also argues 
and demonstrates that the inherent risk aversion of women makes them less likely to engage in 
earnings management (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Lakhal et al.; 2015; Harakeh et al., 2019), 
which also supports the assumption that preferences for uncertainty avoidance discourage 
earnings management practices. The majority of the studies presented in Table I also provide 
empirical evidence of a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and earnings 
management. Few studies report the opposite, but they mostly have a country-level approach, 
relying on an estimation model with about 30 observations. Based on the arguments presented 
above, we expect to find a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and earnings 
management.  
Additionally, we expect the influence of uncertainty avoidance in earning management 
to be more pronounced in emerging countries compared to developed countries. Emerging 
countries are characterized by lower levels of accounting enforcement compared to developed 
economies (Preiato et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2014), as well as greater frequency of political 
instability, aggressive macroeconomic fluctuations, and unpredictable shocks (Gao et al., 
2017). In this environment (emerging countries), there is, therefore, a lower probability of 
earnings management to be uncovered, which may provide managers with an incentive to 
engage in this practice. In fact, the literature points out that firms from emerging countries 
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present a higher level of earnings management than firms from developed countries (e.g., 
Flores et al., 2016; Rathke et al., 2016), which is a matter of concern for regulators. Thus, it is 
likely that strong uncertainty avoidance societies in emerging markets should be even more 
concerned about creating more detailed rules and guaranteeing effective control on how firms 
report their financial information. This concern would be less evident in the developed 
countries, given a higher quality of the informational environment and greater coverage by 
analysts and sophisticated investors (Martins and Barros, 2021) – typically inherent to more 
developed economies. In other words, such characteristics of developed countries should 
constrain potential abusive and unethical practices by managers, thereby making the effect of 
aversion to uncertainty less pronounced in these markets. 
Another argument prompting our expectation is the finding that risk aversion among 
women discourages earnings management practices only in environments of lower equity-
based compensation (Harris et al., 2019), which is more common in emerging countries than 
in developed countries (Albuquerque and Miau, 2013). 
Overall, we hypothesize as follows: 
 H1: There is a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and earnings 
management in both developed and emerging countries, but this association is greater in 
emerging countries. 
3.2 Individualism 
Hofstede’s individualism dimension refers to a preference for a society in which the ties 
between individuals are loose, and everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his 
or her immediate family. Its opposite, collectivism, refers to the preference for a society in 
which people are integrated from birth into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout a 
person’s lifetime protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
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Compared with individualist cultures, economic agents in collectivist cultures are 
relatively less likely to follow social norms such as integrity, law obedience, and honesty 
(Zhang et al., 2013). It is likely that managers may therefore prefer corporate insider interests 
when there is a conflict of interest between corporate insiders (the in-group) and outside 
investors (the out-group), resulting in higher agency costs in collectivist cultures. Thus, 
managers and controlling shareholders tend to manage reported earnings to mask true firm 
performance and conceal their private benefits from outsiders. Callen et al. (2011) also argue 
that low individualism countries are characterized by the development of powerful networks 
of kinship and nepotism that are more susceptible to corruption and that as a result, earnings 
management practices are more likely to be acceptable in these countries. Indeed, the majority 
of the studies presented in Table I also provide empirical evidence of a negative association 
between individualism and earnings management (e.g., Paredes and Wheatley, 2017; Riahi and 
Omri, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Callen et al., 2011). Few studies report the opposite and they 
mostly rely on very old data (e.g., Guan et al., 2005). Based on the arguments presented above, 
we expect to find a negative association between individualism and earnings management. 
We also expect the influence of individualism in earnings management to be more 
pronounced in emerging countries when compared to developed countries. In emerging 
countries, there is greater ownership concentration and a higher presence of family-owned 
firms (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013), which are associated with a higher level of earnings 
management due to the expropriation of minority shareholders by the family owners 
(entrenchment effect) facilitated by the weak environment of investor protection in these 
countries (Chi et al., 2015). Lyu et al. (2017) argue that the social connections among corporate 
insiders are stronger in collectivist societies, thereby reducing corporate monitoring and 
efficiency and exacerbating the entrenchment incentives of large shareholders. They also show 
empirically that the poor earnings quality that normally goes hand-in-hand with concentrated 
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ownership is improved when the firm’s national culture is individualist. We expect this effect 
of individualism in mitigating earnings management practices to be more visible in the 
emerging countries, where the levels of ownership concentration and entrenchment agency 
problem are more present. Overall, we hypothesize as follows: 
H2: There is a negative association between individualism and earnings management 
in both developed and emerging countries, but this association is greater in emerging 
countries. 
3.3 Power distance 
Hofstede’s power distance dimension refers to the extent to which the less powerful members 
of institutions and organizations in a country accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally (Hofstede et al., 2010). People in stronger power distance societies accept a 
hierarchical order in which everybody has a place that needs no further justification. People in 
weaker power distance societies strive for power equalization and demand justification for 
power inequalities. 
Gray et al. (2015) argue that in higher power distance countries the power is more 
concentrated in the hands of only a few privileged individuals, which inhibits the free exchange 
of ideas and is contradictory to informational openness. Thus, high levels of power distance 
are expected to increase the tendency for earnings management, given that management is less 
likely to care about the community benefit and shareholder interest and tends to abuse power 
and manage earnings to achieve their personal goals.  
Hence, given that managers in cultures with high levels of power distance would have 
the greatest power in the management of operations, it is likely that the power distance is 
positively associated with earnings manipulation (Paredes and Wheatley, 2017). Indeed, the 
majority of the studies presented in Table I provide empirical evidence of a positive association 
between power distance and earnings management. However, it is also possible to argue and 
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find the opposite. Riahi and Omri (2013) empirically demonstrate a negative association 
between power distance and earnings management, arguing on a potential acceptability of 
power distribution in countries with higher levels of power distance, which could reduce 
managers’ motivation to show that their firms are more competent than others. Based on the 
divergence of these theoretical arguments, we expect the influence of the countries’ power 
distance in earning management to differ depending on whether they are developed countries 
or emerging countries, as we explain in greater detail below. 
There is a stream of literature showing that chief executive officers (CEOs) engage in 
earnings management activities to inflate earnings, and accordingly boost the value of their 
compensation packages (e.g. Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Sloan, 1996; Bergstresser 
and Philippon, 2006; Laux and Laux, 2009). The so-called “managerial short-termism,” 
whereby managers, in their self-interest, aim to maximize the firm’s earning and stock prices 
(and consequently their compensation) by sacrificing long-term growth opportunities, is a 
powerful incentive for earnings management practices (Harris et al., 2019). However, some 
studies provide empirical evidence that in emerging countries, or at least in countries with 
lower investment protection, the CEO compensation is not associated with firm performance, 
or is at least less associated with it (e.g., Osei-Bonsu and Lutta, 2016).  This eliminates, or 
lessens, the role of CEO compensation in explaining earnings management practices in firms 
from such countries, as opposed to what happens in developed countries. 
Therefore, other incentives seem to play a major role in explaining earnings 
management in emerging countries. There is a great ownership concentration and a high 
presence of family-owned firms in emerging countries (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013), which 
is associated with lower monitoring costs for large shareholders (e.g., Balsmeier and 
Czarnitzki, 2017; Gaur et al., 2015; Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). However, given the weak 
environment of investor protection in emerging countries, large shareholders have higher 
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incentives and the ability to expropriate minority shareholders (Paiva et al., 2019). Previous 
literature argues and demonstrates empirically that in emerging countries the lower probability 
of earnings management being uncovered makes it easier to camouflage the effects of minority 
shareholders’ expropriation through earnings management practices (e.g., Chi et al., 2015; 
Razzaque et al., 2016).  
Based on these differences in the incentives for earnings management practices in 
emerging and developed countries, we expect to find a different role of the cultural dimension 
power distance in these two groups of countries. More specifically, we argue that in the 
emerging countries with higher levels of power distance (i.e., where less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations in a country accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally), managers are less motivated to hide the effects of shareholders’ expropriation and 
are consequently less likely to engage in earnings management. By contrast, in developed 
countries, it is likely that stronger power distance societies increase the tendency for earnings 
management, given that managers, whose compensation would probably be associated with 
firm performance, are less likely to care about the community benefit and shareholder interest 
and tend to abuse power and manage earnings to achieve their personal goals. 
Overall, we hypothesize as follows: 
H3: There is a positive (negative) association between power distance and earnings 
management in developed (emerging) countries. 
3.4 Masculinity 
Hofstede’s masculinity dimension refers to the extent to which emotional gender roles are 
clearly distinct in a society where men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on 
material success, while women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with 
the quality of life (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
Gray et al. (2015) argue that in a society with a high level of masculinity, managers 
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tend to focus on material success and financial achievement. It is likely, therefore, that 
decision-makers from such societies will present aggressive behaviour that includes 
decisiveness and competitiveness (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011). Thus, their priority is likely an 
economic objective, which increases the likelihood of engaging in earnings management. Guan 
and Pourjalali (2010) also argue that the masculinity dimension addresses the values that the 
society gives to performance and visible achievement, which is why managers in masculine 
societies tend to manage earnings more often (to show their achievement in case of upward 
earnings choices or to reduce it – “take a bath” – in anticipation of future increases in earnings).  
Most of the studies presented in Table I provide empirical evidence of a positive 
association between power masculinity and earnings management. However, it is also possible 
to argue and find the opposite. Paredes and Wheatley (2017) empirically demonstrate a 
negative association between masculinity and earnings management, arguing that managers in 
cultures characterized by high levels of masculinity might be unconcerned with external 
monitoring, because of their ego, and would be reluctant to engage in earnings management to 
meet externally-derived performance benchmarks. We expect the influence of the country’s 
level of masculinity in earning management to differ depending on whether it is a developed 
country or an emerging one. 
As discussed in the power distance section, firms in emerging countries are less likely 
to be managed for the benefit of the wide range of shareholders because the poor protection of 
investor rights makes it easier for management and controlling shareholders to appropriate 
corporate resources for their benefit (Pinkowitz et al. 2003). Additionally, the CEO’s 
compensation contract departs from the standards of the optimal contracting perspective and is 
shaped to better accommodate the CEO’s preferences, i.e., higher total compensation and lower 
performance-related pay. Therefore, we argue that in the emerging countries with a higher level 
of masculinity, managers are less likely to engage in earnings management to meet external 
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pressure when compared to more “feminine” emerging countries. By contrast, in the developed 
countries a higher level of masculinity is expected to increase the tendency for earnings 
management, given that managers, whose compensation would probably be associated with 
firm performance, tend to focus on material success and financial achievement, engaging in 
earnings management as a way of maximizing their personal economic benefit. Overall, we 
hypothesize as follows: 
H4: There is a positive (negative) association between masculinity and earnings 
management in developed (emerging) countries. 
3.5 Long-term orientation 
Hofstede’s long-term orientation dimension stands for the fostering of virtues oriented toward 
future rewards — in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its polar opposite, short-term 
orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present — in particular, 
respect for tradition, preservation of “face,” and fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede et al., 
2010). 
This dimension is less explored in previous empirical research. Gray et al. (2015) argue 
and find empirically that managers use earnings management to achieve a long-term goal and, 
therefore, countries with a long-term orientation are associated with a higher level of earnings 
management (in a way that focuses on long-term effects). Also, using the socioemotional 
wealth theory to explain the reporting practices of family firms, Achleitner et al. (2014) argue 
that because family firms might care more about the long-term value of the firm, they are more 
likely than non-family firms to manage reported earnings downward. In so doing, lower 
reported earnings would, for instance, relieve shareholder pressure for higher dividends, and 
this strategy would help the family retain value for future investments and help the business 
survive in the long run. Therefore, and considering that long-term orientation is associated with 
a tendency toward long-term views and preservation of firms’ reputation (Hofstede et al., 
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2010), we suspect that in firms from countries with greater long-term orientation the managers 
would be involved in more ambitious practices of earnings manipulation to maintain such 
performance and reputation over time. Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
H5: There is a positive association between long-term orientation and earnings 
management in both developed and emerging countries. 
3.6 Indulgence 
Hofstede’s indulgence dimension stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of 
basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its polar opposite, 
restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict 
social norms (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
This dimension is a relatively new addition to the Hofstede model, and to the best of 
our knowledge there is no published study providing empirical evidence on the specific 
relationship between indulgence and earnings management. Indeed, Gray et al. (2015) call for 
research analyzing the relationship between the indulgence dimension and accounting. High 
levels of indulgence are related to societies that feel free speech is important, that give higher 
importance to leisure, and where a higher percentage of people declare themselves very happy 
(Hofstede, 2011). We argue that the feelings of “satisfaction” and “pleasure” that characterize 
indulgent societies may persuade economic agents to be involved in lower levels of earnings 
management, given that they feel less pressured for better results, or even consider performance 
less important than business competition. Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
H6: There is a negative association between indulgence and earnings management in 
both developed and emerging countries. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1 Sample and data 
Our empirical study relies on a sample composed of 6,313 firm-year observations of non-
financial listed firms from 11 emerging countries, and 27,605 firm-year observations from 22 
developed countries. We classify countries as emerging and developed according to 
International Monetary Fund guidelines2. Overall, the analysis includes only countries with 
available data on the national cultural dimensions of Hofstede – our main independent variable 
(this is further detailed in section 4.3, Estimation model). Intending to guarantee the 
homogeneity of the sample, we also consider only observations from countries whose listed 
firms are required to apply IFRS (based on the information available in the IFRS Foundation 
website), and we use data reported after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, ranging from 2006 
to 2018. The data is collected from the Thompson Reuters Datastream database; we exclude 
firm-year observations with negative total equity and missing values needed to calculate 
earnings management and control variables. Table II details our sample selection procedure. 
 
(Insert Table II here) 
 
Table III shows the sample distribution by country. Among the emerging countries, 
Poland and Brazil are the most representative countries, which together represent about half of 
the sample. The smallest representation is for Egypt, Morocco, and Ukraine, which together 
represent around 2 percent of the sample. Concerning the developed countries, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, and Canada are the most representative of the sample, 
 
2 Despite some small differences, in general the classification of emerging economies proposed by international institutions 
such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United 
Nations are similar. 
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representing together about half of the sample, while New Zealand, Slovenia, and the Czech 
Republic are the least representative, together representing only 2 percent. 
 
(Insert Table III here) 
 
4.2 Earnings management measures 
The dependent variable we use in the empirical analysis is a measure of earnings management 
(accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management). We proxy accruals-
based earnings management at the firm-level through the absolute amount of discretionary 
accruals, as consistently recommended by a large body of relevant previous literature (e.g., 
Lara, 2020; Osma, 2020; Trimble, 2018; Black et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2015; Ahmed, 2015; 
Kothari et al., 2005). We employ the modified Jones (1991) model as proposed by Dechow et 
al. (1995), according to Equation (1). Additionally, to control for the influence of firm 
performance, we follow the recommendations of Kothari et al. (2005) and also include as 
regressors a measure of firm performance, namely return on assets. The absolute values of the 
estimated residuals from Equation (1) are our main measure for accruals-based earnings 
management. Equation (1) is estimated in clusters requiring at least eight observations, 
segregating the parameter estimates for each year, industry (SIC two digits), and type of 
country (emerging versus developed). We also control accruals-based earnings management 
estimations for specific country-level variation components by including lagged gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth (see, e.g., Trimble, 2018; Chaney et al., 2011). 
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where, for each firm i in year t, TA are the total accruals. ∆CA is the change in current assets 
for each firm i from year t-1 to year t. ∆CL is the change in current liabilities. ∆CASH is the 
change in total cash reserve. ∆STDEBT is the change in the short-term debt. ∆DEP is the 
amount of depreciation expenses. Ats is the change in total assets. ∆Sales is the change in sales. 
∆REC is the change in net receivables. GPPE is the gross amount of property, plant, and 
equipment. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items scaled to total assets.  
Concerning real earnings management estimations, we rely on Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
empirical models, which examine real earnings management based on three distinct metrics: 
the abnormal level of production costs (ABN_PROD), cash flows from operations (ABN_CFO), 
and discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX), according to estimated residuals from Equations (3), 
(4), and (5), respectively. As for accruals-based earnings management estimation, Equations 
(3), (4), and (5) are estimated for each for each year, industry (SIC two digits), and type of 
country (emerging versus developed) clusters requiring at least eight observations. We control 
for country-level variation components by including lagged GDP growth (see, e.g., Trimble, 
2018; Chaney et al., 2011). We multiply ABN_CFO and ABN_DISX by negative one so that 
the higher amount, the more likely it is that managers are engaged in price discounts and cutting 
discretionary expenses, respectively3. Finally, we aggregate all of the three real earnings 
management proxies into a single variable, REM, which represents the sum of ABN_PROD, 
ABN_CFO, and ABN_DISX (e.g., Doukakis, 2014; Black et al., 2017; Trimble, 2018). 
 
 
3 Similar to Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Doukakis (2014), we do not multiply ABN_PROD by negative one because higher 
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where, for each firm i in year t, PROD is the amount of production costs, defined as the sum of 
cost of goods sold and changes in inventory from the year t-1 to t. CFO is the amount of cash 
flows from operations calculated indirectly as net income minus total accruals. DISX is the 
amount of discretionary expenses defined as the sum of research and development (R&D), and 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. All other variables are as previously 
defined. 
 
4.3 Estimation model 
To investigate how the association between national culture and earnings management 
compares between developed and emerging countries, we estimate the following regression 
model: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽0 +  𝛿1𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗  +  𝛾 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  +                                                             (6) 
 
 25 
where for each firm i in year t from country j, the dependent variable (EM) represents both 
accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). The 
independent variable (CULTURE) represents the national cultural dimensions of Hofstede 
(2011), namely uncertainty avoidance (UNC), individualism (INDIV), power distance 
(POWER), masculinity (MASC), long-term orientation (LONG), and indulgence (INDULG) for 
each country j.  
Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions framework is one of the most influential 
national cultural classifications (Kirkman et al., 2006). Hofstede provides a wide database that 
allows the empirical analysis of cultural values for a wide range of both developed and 
emerging countries. The majority of culture research in management and international business 
is built on the scores of these dimensions (Gray et al., 2015). In addition, Gray’s (1988) theory 
of accounting values, which explains how cultural factors influence the nation’s accounting 
systems, is actually based on Hofstede’s national culture framework. These factors together 
may justify the vast literature on the association between cultural factors and earnings 
management that relies on Hofstede’s culture classification (see Table I). By focusing on 
Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions, we also maintain the comparability of our findings 
with those reported in the previous literature. 
Equation (6) includes a vector of control variable that prior research identifies as being 
associated with earnings management levels (e.g., Lara, 2020; Osma, 2020; Pham et al. 2019; 
Larson et al., 2018; Trimble, 2018; Abdallah, 2018; Black et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2015; 
Doukakis, 2014; Han et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 2005).  
Table IV identifies and explains the way each of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables are measured. 
 
(Insert Table IV here) 
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Moreover, Equation (6) is estimated separately for the emerging and the developed 
countries samples. Considering the hypotheses H1 through H6, we expect the coefficient 𝛿1 to 
be statistically significant in both emerging and developed economies, and to have a positive 
or negative sign depending on the different cultural dimensions analysed (uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, distance from power, masculinity, long-term orientation, and 
indulgence)4. In addition, to test the difference of national culture variables coefficients 
between emerging and developed countries regressions, we perform a generalized Hausman 
specification test (see, e.g., Weesie, 2000). 
We estimate Equation (6) by using Ordinary least squares (OLS), with t-statistics based 
on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, by taking into account clusters at the 
firm level (Peterson, 2009). All continuous firm-level variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 
99 percent tails (Cox, 2006). We also control Equation (6) for industry- and year-fixed effects. 
To guarantee no bias effect regarding outliers, we exclude observations with absolute value of 
studentized residuals greater than three. Finally, we also follow the suggestions of Chen et al. 
(2018) concerning the high probability of having biased coefficients and standard errors that 
can lead to incorrect inferences, with both Type I and Type II errors in the typical “two-step” 
procedure concerning both accruals-based and real earnings management estimations. Thus, 
we also include in Equation (6), among the control variables, the regressors of the first-step 
regressions in all estimations5. 
 
4 We also consider estimating Model (6) with all the culture variables and their interactions at the same time. However, as the 
national culture variables are at the country level and do not vary over time (Hofstede, 2011), we discard this possibility for 
obvious bias issues related to confounding effects and multicollinearity (e.g., Isidro et al., 2020). 
5 Chen et al. (2018) evaluate the two-step regression procedure usually used in discretionary accruals literature. The typical 
procedure used in these studies is to first estimate the discretionary or unexpected component as the residual from an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression, in which the predicted value represents the normal, non-discretionary, or expected component. 
The unexpected component (i.e., the first-stage residual) is then used as the dependent variable in a second-step OLS regression 
designed to test hypotheses about its determinants. Chen et al. (2018) show that when the first-step regressors are not included 
in the second-step regression, the two-step procedure generates biased estimates of the second-step regressors and can result 
in Type I and Type II errors. According to the authors, “There is no econometric justification for this two-step procedure and 
we emphasize that the most straightforward way to avoid the bias generated by the procedure is to simply estimate the model 
in a single regression” (Chen et al., 2018, p. 752). 
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5 Empirical Findings 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table V presents the values of the six national cultural dimensions provided by Hofstede (the 
main independent variable), which differ from country to country but remain stable in each of 
them over the years, given that national culture is a society construct with a more permanent 
characteristic when compared to other institutional factors. On average, the emerging countries 
score statistically significantly higher in the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension, while the 
developed countries score statistically significantly higher in the Individualism and Long-Term 
Orientation dimensions. In fact, previous literature points out high uncertainty levels in 
emerging countries, given that they are more exposed to general fluctuations and more 
domestic political shocks (like coups, revolutions, and wars), are more susceptible to natural 
disasters (like epidemics and floods), and have less-effective fiscal and monetary stabilization 
policies (e.g., Bloom, 2014). In addition, previous research also reports a positive relationship 
between individualism and characteristics linked to developed markets, such as lower numbers 
of synchronized stock price movements (Zhan, 2019) and higher levels of entrepreneurship 
(Baena, 2012). In the same vein, the economic stability of developed countries is likely to 
strengthen a longer-term view of these economies (Tang and Koveos, 2008). Finally, we find 
no statistically significant difference at conventional levels between the average of emerging 
and developed countries concerning the Masculinity and Indulgence dimensions. 
Regarding the group of emerging countries, we find that Russia and Ukraine present 
the highest scores for Uncertainty Avoidance (UNCER = 0.93 and 0.92, respectively), for 
Masculinity (MASC = 0.95 for both countries), and for Long-Term Orientation (LONG = 0.81 
and 0.86, respectively), while Poland presents the highest scores for Individualism (INDIV = 
0.60) and Mexico presents the highest scores for Power Distance and Indulgence (POWER = 
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0.69, and INDULG = 0.97). Regarding the group of developed countries, we find that Slovenia, 
Australia, Austria, Greece, Germany, and Sweden present the highest scores for Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UNCER = 0.71), Individualism (INDIV = 0.90), Power Distance (POWER = 0.79), 
Masculinity (MASC = 1.00), Long-Term Orientation (LONG = 0.83), and Indulgence (INDUL 
= 0.78), respectively.  
 
(Insert Table V here) 
 
Table VI presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and control variables 
included in the empirical study. The mean value of the dependent variable AEM (REM) for the 
emerging countries – 0.0635 (0.0022) – is statistically higher than for the developed economies 
– 0.0571 (-0.0590). Although these descriptive univariate statistics do not control for other 
factors, they suggest higher levels of earnings management of firms in emerging countries. 
Moreover, those findings generally corroborate previous literature, which demonstrates that 
firms in emerging countries engage in more earnings management than those in developed 
economies (e.g., Lourenço et al., 2018; Flores et al., 2016; Lin and Wu, 2014) 
 
(Insert Table VI here) 
 
Table VII presents the correlation matrix for the emerging and developed countries 
samples. Overall, the findings demonstrate a significant correlation between the earnings 
management measures (AEM and REM) and the national cultural dimensions in the case of 
both emerging and developed countries. These results suggest the relevance of a country’s 
culture in shaping firms’ earnings manipulation strategies. Concerning the control variables, 
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we highlight that there are not many high values of correlations among them, which suggests 
that there is no multicollinearity problem in our estimations. 
 
(Insert Table VII here) 
 
5.2 Regression results 
Tables VIII and IX present the summary statistics resulting from the estimation of Model (6) 
for both accruals-based and real earnings management, respectively. As mentioned, we 
estimate this model separately for the emerging and the developed countries samples. We find 
that the estimates for the coefficients of the cultural variable Uncertainty Avoidance are 
negative and statistically significant when taking into account REM in both emerging (-0.283, 
t-stat = -4.04) and developed countries (-0.039, t-stat = -2.49). Moreover, by applying the 
traditional Hausman test, we find that the coefficient of the variable Uncertainty Avoidance is 
significantly higher in the group of emerging countries when compared to developed countries. 
These findings partially support H1. It seems that strong uncertainty avoidance societies are 
more likely to rely on detailed rules and regulation and respect for conformity, linked to an 
accounting profession that is subject to public statutory control, with limited self-governance 
(Gray, 1988), and hence tending to provide fewer opportunities and incentives for earnings 
management. However, this effect is more pronounced in the set of emerging countries, in 
which there are lower levels of accounting enforcement and a greater frequency of 
unpredictable shocks, political instability, and aggressive macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Our findings also show that the estimates for the coefficients of the cultural dimension 
Individualism are negative and statistically significant when taking into account accruals-based 
earnings management in both emerging (-0.011, t-stat = -1.62) and developed countries (-
0.026, t-stat = -7.74). Therefore, our findings support the hypothesis of a negative association 
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between individualism and earnings management in both developed and emerging countries 
(H2). However, the coefficient of the cultural dimension Individualism is significantly higher 
in the group of developed countries when compared to the emerging countries, which goes 
against H2.  
 
 (Insert Table VIII here) 
 
Tables VIII and IX reveal that the coefficients of the cultural variable Power Distance 
are negative and statistically significant in emerging countries by taking into account both 
accruals-based earnings management (-0.027, t-stat = -2.80) and real earnings management (-
0.370, t-stat = -8.55), but are positive and statistically significant in developed economies when 
considering both accruals-based earnings management (0.013, t-stat = 4.46) and real earnings 
management (0.065, t-stat = 2.75). This means that higher levels of power distance are 
associated with a higher (lower) inclination of firms to engage in earnings management in 
developed (emerging) countries, either by accruals-based or real earnings management 
strategies. These results allow us to confirm H3. It seems that in the group of emerging 
countries, managers (whose compensation would probably not be strongly linked to firm 
performance) in countries with a higher level of power distance are less motivated to show that 
their firms are more competent than others and thus are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Moreover, considering that less powerful economies’ agents of institutions and 
organizations in less developed countries accept and expect that power is distributed unequally 
(Riahi and Omri, 2013), managers could feel less motivated to hide the effects of shareholders’ 
expropriation and, consequently, less likely to engage in earnings management. By contrast, in 
the developed countries large power distance is expected to increase the tendency for earnings 
management, given that managers (whose compensation would probably be associated with 
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firm performance) are less likely to care about the community benefit and shareholder interest, 
and tend to abuse power and manage earnings to achieve their personal goal. 
The results also show that the coefficients of the cultural variable Masculinity are 
negative and statistically significant in emerging countries when taking into account accruals-
based earnings management (-0.025, t-stat = -4.00), but are positive and statistically significant 
in developed economies, by considering either accruals-based earnings management (0.009, t-
stat = 4.65) or real earnings management (0.097, t-stat = 6.36). This suggests that higher levels 
of masculinity are associated with a higher (lower) propensity of firms to engage in earnings 
management in developed (emerging) countries. These results also allow us to confirm H4. It 
seems that in the emerging countries with a higher level of masculinity, managers are less likely 
to engage in earnings management to meet external pressure when compared to the other 
emerging countries. By contrast, in the developed countries a higher level of masculinity is 
expected to increase the tendency for earnings management, given that managers (whose 
compensation would probably be associated with firm performance) tend to focus on material 
success and financial achievement, engaging in earnings management as a way of boosting 
their personal economic benefit. 
 
(Insert Table IX here) 
 
Tables VIII and IX also reveal that the estimates for the coefficients of the cultural 
variable Long-Term are positive and statistically significant when considering accruals-based 
earnings management in both emerging (0.011, t-stat = 1.90) and developed countries (0.011, 
t-stat = 4.32) and, by contrast, they are negative and statistically significant when considering 
real earnings management in either emerging (-0.043, t-stat = -1.69) or developed countries (-
0.121, t-stat = -6.74). These results also allow us to confirm H5, but only taking into account 
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accruals-based earnings management. It seems that in countries where the long-term 
perspective is more valued in formulating strategies, goals, and objectives, managers prefer to 
engage more in accruals-based earnings management but at the expense of a lower level of real 
earnings management. There is a trade-off, or substitution effect, between accruals-based and 
real earnings management by firms in countries with a higher level of Long-Term Orientation. 
Indeed, the previous literature provides consistent discussions regarding the substitution effect 
between the two earnings management strategies (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
Given that both accruals-based and real earnings management are costly activities, 
firms engage in a trade-off between them based on their relative costliness – in other words, 
when one activity is relatively more costly, firms engage in more of the other. Thus, because 
firms face different costs and constraints for the two earnings management approaches, they 
show differing abilities to use the two strategies (Zhang, 2012). Besides, real earnings 
management must occur during the fiscal year and is realized by the fiscal year-end, after which 
managers still have the chance to adjust the level of accruals-based earnings management. 
Therefore, there is also a direct, substitutive relationship between the two; if real earnings 
management turns out to be unexpectedly high (low), then managers will decrease (increase) 
the level of accruals-based earnings management they undertake (Zhang, 2012). Moreover, 
“real earnings management activities are significantly different than accrual-based ones as they 
have direct effects on cash flows” (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, p. 4). In fact, previous literature 
suggests that real earnings management “increases a firm’s cost of capital and imposes greater 
long-term costs on shareholders because of its negative impact on future cash flows” (Paredes 
and Wheatley, 2017, p. 39). Thus, in countries with a long-term orientation, firms could prefer 
earnings management practices that have a less negative effect in the long term – fostering 
greater involvement in accruals-based earnings management in detriment of real earnings 
management, which can have negative effects in the long term. 
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Our results also point out that the estimates for the coefficients of the cultural variable 
Indulgence are statistically significant but only in developed countries, with a negative sign for 
accruals-based earnings management (-0.030, t-stat = -10.38), and a positive one for real 
earnings management (0.112, t-stat = 5.66). These results also allow us to confirm H6, but only 
when taking into account accruals-based earnings management in developed countries. 
Overall, these findings indicate that in developed countries with high levels of indulgence, 
firms tend to engage less (more) in accruals-based earnings management (real earnings 
management). Hence, we again find hints of a potential trade-off, or substitution effect, 
between accruals-based and real earnings management by firms in developed countries with a 
higher level of indulgence. As mentioned, previous literature indeed provides evidence of a 
substitution effect between accruals-based and real earnings management in certain contexts 
(e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zhang, 2012). 
Concerning control variables, consistent with prior literature we find overall evidence 
that less profitable, high growth firms, and those with negative earnings engage in higher levels 
of earnings management, in both developed and emerging countries, which is consistent with 
previous literature (e.g., Paredes and Wheatley, 2017; Doukakis, 2014). Moreover, consistent 
with Ipino and Parbonetti (2017), we also find evidence that smaller (larger) firms are 
associated with higher levels of accruals-based earnings management (real earnings 
management) and that high levels of leverage are linked with high levels of earnings 
manipulations only by accruals. 
Overall, we find that firms from countries with a higher level of uncertainty avoidance 
and individualism are less likely to engage in earnings management, but the effect of the 
uncertainty avoidance (indulgence) is more (less) pronounced in emerging countries. Our 
findings also show that firms in emerging (developed) countries with higher levels of power 
distance and masculinity are less (more) likely to engage in earnings management. In addition, 
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we find that firms in countries with a higher level of long-term orientation (indulgence) are 
more (less) likely to engage in accruals-based earnings management, at the expense of a 
decrease (increase) in the level of real earnings management, but the association between 
indulgence and earnings management is observable only in the developed countries. 
While the previous literature reports the effects of national culture on earnings 
management, relying on samples mostly composed of developed countries, we add to this 
discussion by analysing the emerging and developed countries separately. Our results suggest 
that the effect of culture on earnings management differs between firms in developed countries 
and emerging countries. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that some of the cultural 
dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2011) seem to exhibit a substitution effect between 
accruals-based and real earnings management tactics (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 
2012), while other factors seem to reveal a complementary effect (e.g., Li et al., 2018; 
Khunkaew and Qingxiang, 2019; Li, 2019). 
 
6 Robustness Analysis 
Seeking greater robustness in our results, we also perform several robustness checks. First, we 
estimate our main model by considering alternative variables for both accruals-based and real 
earnings management. 
Concerning the accruals-based earnings management alternative proxies, we take into 
account Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) amendments to the modified Jones model 
(AEM_Alternative1), which additionally include two regressors: the book-to-market ratio and 
current operating performance. As an alternative measure for accruals-based earnings 
management, we also estimate a modified Jones model by including the one-year lag of total 
accruals as discussed by Dechow et al. (2012), given the inherent property of accrual 
accounting that any accrual-based earnings management in one period must reverse in another 
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period (AEM_Alternative2). The estimations for these accruals-based earnings management 
sensitivity tests are reported in Table X. Overall, the results remain qualitatively the same as 
those presented in our main analysis. 
 
(Insert Table X here) 
 
Regarding the real earnings management alternative proxies, instead of considering a 
single proxy by the sum of ABN_PROD, ABN_CFO, and ABN_DISX, we segregate REM in 
order to form two different variables, as pointed out by previous studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2012; Abad et al., 2018): REM_Alternative1, which represents the sum of 
abnormal levels of productions costs (ABN_PROD) and abnormal levels of discretionary 
expenses (ABN_DISX multiplied by negative -1); and REM_Alternative2, which represents the 
sum of abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (ABN_CFO multiplied by negative one) 
and abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX multiplied by negative one). The 
estimations for these real earnings management sensitivity tests are in Table XI. Overall, the 
results remain qualitatively the same as those presented in our main analysis. 
 
(Insert Table XI here) 
 
Second, we explore whether the association between national culture and earnings 
management can also be found even after considering the joint effect of culture and 
enforcement. Indeed, “enforcement is an important element of the institutional framework that 
assures the quality of financial reporting by listed companies” (Ewert and Wagenhorfer, 2019, 
p. 122). Therefore, considering the relevance of accounting systems enforcement factors to 
earnings manipulation (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013), we estimate our main model by 
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additionally considering an interaction term between national cultural dimensions and 
enforcement (CULTURE x Enforcement). More specifically, Enforcement is a dummy that 
assumes one for observations that the RULE OF LAW value is greater than its median, and zero 
otherwise. We make this classification in enforcement by the RULE OF LAW median for 
emerging and developed countries observations separately. The results are presented in Table 
XII. Overall, the effect of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on earnings management remains 
qualitatively the same as those presented in our main analysis, and the level of enforcement 
seems to moderate the effect of these cultural dimensions on earnings management. 
 
(Insert Table XII here) 
 
Third, we investigate whether the association between national culture and earnings 
management can also be found even after considering the joint effect of culture and corruption. 
A higher country level of corruption can create an unethical atmosphere that encourages 
individuals to accept earnings management practices to a greater extent. Pappas (2010) 
demonstrates empirically that earnings management is higher in more corrupted European 
Union countries because insiders might be more prone to exercise incentives to mask corporate 
performance. Lourenço et al. (2018) also show empirically that country-level perceived 
corruption is positively related to earnings management in emerging economies. We estimate 
our main model by additionally considering the variable Corruption and its interactions with 
the national cultural dimensions. The variable Corruption is computed based on the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is a leading measure 
of perceptions regarding corruption that ranks countries by perceived levels of corruption 
among public officials. A higher index indicates lower levels of perceived corruption. 
Corruption is a dummy variable that assumes one for observations that the CPI is lower than 
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its median (i.e., higher corruption) and zero otherwise. We make this classification in 
Corruption by the CPI median for emerging and developed countries observations separately. 
The results are presented in Table XIII. Overall, the results regarding the effect of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions on earnings management remain qualitatively the same as those presented 
in our main analysis, and the level of corruption seems to moderate the effect of these cultural 
dimensions on earnings management. 
 
(Insert Table XIII here) 
 
Fourth, in view of potential inference errors related to the subprime crisis period (2007-
2009), we estimate our main model by considering a more recent period of only five years, 
from 2014 through 2018. Fifth, similar to Callen et al. (2011), we estimate our main models 
without any country-level control variables, and introduce them one by one, interchangeably. 
Sixth, we also follow Leuz et al. (2003) and construct alternative measures for both accruals-
based and real earnings management by ranking our main dependent variables such that a 
higher score suggests a higher level of earnings management. Finally, considering possible 
inconsistencies of the estimated parameters due to the truncation of the dependent variable 
(absolute values), as robustness tests we also re-run all accruals-based earnings management 
models based on the Tobit (1958) regression approach, following previous earnings 
management literature (e.g., Chaney et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Cassell et al., 2015). In all 
of these last alternative scenarios, untabulated findings show fundamentally the same results 
regarding the coefficient of our main variables. 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
This study investigates the association between national culture and earnings management, and 
how it differs between developed and emerging countries. The empirical analysis relies on a 
sample of 6,313 firm-year observations of non-financial listed firms from 11 emerging 
countries and 27,605 observations from 22 developed countries. Our findings suggest that 
Hofstede’s (2011) cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, 
masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence) are associated with both accruals-based 
and real earnings management, but this association differs between firms from developed and 
emerging countries. In other words, our empirical findings suggest that earnings management 
practices by managers seem to be influenced by the national culture where the firms are 
headquartered and that this influence seems to differ between firms from emerging and 
developed countries. Given the clear differences in the institutional and economic 
environments between developed and emerging countries, our results determine that the 
influences of national culture on firms’ earnings management strategies differ between those 
two types of countries. We add to the literature on national culture and earnings management 
by providing evidence on how the association between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and 
earnings management compares between developed and emerging countries. 
Our empirical findings also contribute to an important debate among investors, standard 
setters, regulators, and other stakeholders on how earnings management strategies differ 
between emerging and developed countries. By demonstrating how the effect of culture on the 
quality of the financial reports (i.e., earnings management) differs between developed and 
emerging countries, we provide an important discussion for standard setters and regulators who 
must take into account the role of institutional and economic characteristics simultaneously in 
the development of accounting standards and monitoring firms strategies. Similarly, 
international investors and analysts should be aware of these characteristics when dealing with 
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accounting information provided by firms from different countries (e.g., emerging versus 
developed countries). 
Our empirical findings raise an important discussion for the accounting profession, 
investors, and standard setters by pointing out how earnings management tactics can be 
associated not only with firm-level incentives but also with institutional (i.e., national culture) 
and economic factors (i.e., country-level development). In addition to the discussions of how 
the culture of the countries matters for the formulation of earnings management strategies, we 
provide an important empirical and theoretical discussion about how this effect is not consistent 
among companies from emerging and developed countries – which should therefore be taken 
into account by standard setters and regulators, as well as by international investors, analysts, 
and other stakeholders who rely on accounting information to make economic decisions. Using 
the same approach when dealing with accounting information provided by firms from different 
countries (e.g., emerging versus developed countries) may not be an appropriate strategy for 
standard setters, regulators, international investors, and other stakeholders. In other words, 
using a “one size fits all” strategy may not be appropriate when applied internationally. Thus, 
regulators and policymakers should develop different strategies depending on the level of 
development of the country (emerging versus developed), as well as its cultural characteristics. 
Despite the methodological rigor and the robustness of our results in the face of several 
additional tests, there are some limitations in our analyses that should be addressed. First, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions may have some element of bias in their composition (Ugrin et 
al., 2017), despite being widely used by previous international accounting researchers (see 
Table I). Second, although our results are robust with and without control variables at the 
country level, it is difficult to fully control for the potential impact of other country factors and 
to disentangle them from the direct effect of cultural dimensions (Zhang et al., 2013). Finally, 
we limit our analyses taking into accounting only IFRS mandatory periods, given the potential 
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bias related to the IFRS adoption. Future researchers may be interested in including other 
national cultural measures (e.g., Global Leadership & Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness 
– GLOBE) to address country factors, complementing issues with different types of estimation 
methods, and also expanding the period of analysis controlling IFRS adoption periods and their 
consequences regarding earnings management strategies. 
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Table I. Cross-country studies on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and earnings management 
References 






  Hofstede’ National Culture Dimensions 
Developed Emerging Overall    UNC INDIV POWER MASC LONG INDUL 
Paredes and Wheatley (2017) 23  8 31  1987-2012 
Real earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  - - + -   
Gray et al. (2015) 14  0 14  2000-2010 
Accruals earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  - - + + +  
Riahi and Omri (2013) 2  1 3  2003-2009 
Accruals earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  + - -    
Zhang et al. (2013) 25 16 41  N/A* 
Index at country level 
(Leuz et al., 2003) 
   -     
Callen et al. (2011) 23 8 31  N/A* 
Index at country level 
(Leuz et al., 2003) 
  + -     
Desender et al. (2011) 23 8 31  1990-1999 
Index at country level 
(Leuz et al., 2003) 
   -     
Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) 23  16 39  1993-2008 
Meet-or-beet prior 
year’s earnings and 
income smoothing 
  - + + +   
Guan and Pourjalali (2010) 20  7 27  1987-2001 
Accruals earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  - + + +   
Han et al. (2010) 23  9 32  1992-2003 
Accruals earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  - +     
Doupnik (2008) 23 8 31  N/A* 
Index at country level 
(Leuz et al., 2003) 
  + -     
Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 
(2007) 
23 7 30  N/A* 
Index at country level 
(Leuz et al., 2003) 
  +   +   
Guan et al. (2005) 4  2 6  1987-1995 
Accruals earnings 
management at firm 
level 
  - +   -  
UNC, INDIV, POWER, MASC, LONG, and INDUL represent uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence, respectively, according to 
Hofstede (2011) cultural dimensions. 
* The paper does not explicitly cover a specific period, usually by relying on country-level variables from different sources (e.g., World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 




Table II. Sample selection procedure 
 
Total 
Overall Datastream available data of firm-year observations (2000-2018)  330,154  
Exclusions  
         Countries without Hofstede and/or IFRS mandatory period data (200,305) 
         Observations regarding the pre-IFRS mandatory adoption (68,720) 
         Financial institutions (6,372) 
         Observations with negative equity (179) 
         Missing values needed to calculate earnings management and control variables (20,660)  
Final Sample 33,918 
         Emerging Countries  6,313  
         Developed Countries  27,605  
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Table III. Sample distribution by country 
 N % % Cum 
Emerging Countries    
Argentina 184 2.91 2.91 
Brazil 1,481 23.46 26.37 
Chile 824 13.05 39.43 
Egypt 28 0.44 39.87 
Mexico 491 7.78 47.65 
Morocco 44 0.70 48.34 
Peru 205 3.25 51.59 
Poland 1,602 25.38 76.97 
Russia 539 8.54 85.51 
Turkey 851 13.48 98.99 
Ukraine 64 1.01 100.00 
                6,313  100.00 - 
Developed Countries N % % Cum 
Australia 919 3.33 3.33 
Austria 555 2.01 5.34 
Belgium 800 2.90 8.24 
Canada 1,999 7.24 15.48 
Czech Republic 71 0.26 15.74 
Denmark 660 2.39 18.13 
Finland 1,065 3.86 21.99 
France 3,608 13.07 35.06 
Germany 3,621 13.12 48.17 
Greece 1,145 4.15 52.32 
Hong Kong 604 2.19 54.51 
Ireland 310 1.12 55.63 
Italy 1,803 6.53 62.16 
Luxembourg 304 1.10 63.26 
Netherlands 1,114 4.04 67.30 
New Zealand 62 0.22 67.52 
Norway 1,119 4.05 71.58 
Portugal 399 1.45 73.02 
Slovenia 165 0.60 73.62 
Spain 1,076 3.90 77.52 
Sweden 1,874 6.79 84.31 
United Kingdom 4,332 15.69 100.00 
              27,605  100.00 - 
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Table IV. Variables description 
Dependent variables 
AEMitj represents the accruals-based earnings management, based on the modified version of the model 
proposed by Jones (1991) to measure discretionary accruals, proposed by Dechow et al. (1995), by 
additionally considering return on assets (Kothari et al., 2005). 
REMitj represents the real earnings management according to Roychowdhury (2006), by the sum of abnormal 
production costs (ABN_PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX) multiplied by minus 1, 
and abnormal cash flows from operations (ABN_CFO) multiplied by minus 1. 
Independent variables 
CULTUREj 
represents uncertainty avoidance (UNC), individualism (INDIV), power distance (POWER), 
masculinity (MASC), long-term orientation (LONG), and indulgence (INDULG), respectively, 
according to Hofstede (2011) culture dimensions. 
Control variables 
SIZEitj is the natural logarithm of end of year total assets. 
ROAitj is the net income scaled by end of year total assets. 
LEVERAGEitj is the end of year total liabilities scaled by end of year total assets. 
GROWTHitj is the percentage change in sales from the year t-1 to t. 
LOSSItj is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm-year observations if net income is lower than 0, and zero 
otherwise. 
BIG4itj is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm-year observations if the firm’s auditor is PwC, KPMG, EY, 
or DTT, and zero otherwise. 
GDPtj Is a natural logarithm of GDP per capita of each country-year. 
RULE OF LAWtj is the index of law enforcement for each country-year. 
CRISISitj is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for 2007, 2008, and 2009, and zero otherwise. 
Robustness test variables 
AEM_Alternative1itj is an alternative measure of the accruals-based earnings management, based on the modified version of 
the model proposed by Jones (1991) to measure discretionary accruals, proposed by Dechow et al. 
(1995), by additionally following Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) recommendations. 
AEM_Alternative2itj is an alternative measure of the accruals-based earnings management, based on the modified version of 
the model proposed by Jones (1991) to measure discretionary accruals, proposed by Dechow et al. 
(1995), by additionally following Dechow et al.’s (2012) recommendations. 
REM_Alternative1itj is an alternative measure of the real earnings management according to Roychowdhury (2006), by the 
sum of abnormal levels of productions costs (ABN_PROD) and abnormal levels of discretionary 
expenses (ABN_DISX multiplied by negative 1). 
REM_Alternative2itj is an alternative measure of the real earnings management according to Roychowdhury (2006), by the 
sum of abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (ABN_CFO multiplied by negative 1) and 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX multiplied by negative 1). 
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Table V. Values of the national culture dimensions provided by Hofstede 
  UNCER INDIV POWER MASC LONG INDULG 
Emerging countries       
Argentina 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.86 0.20 0.62 
Brazil 0.69 0.38 0.49 0.76 0.44 0.59 
Chile 0.63 0.23 0.28 0.86 0.31 0.68 
Egypt 0.70 0.25 0.45 0.80 0.07 0.04 
Mexico 0.81 0.30 0.69 0.82 0.24 0.97 
Morocco 0.70 0.46 0.53 0.68 0.14 0.25 
Peru 0.64 0.16 0.42 0.87 0.25 0.46 
Poland 0.68 0.60 0.64 0.93 0.38 0.29 
Russia 0.93 0.39 0.36 0.95 0.81 0.20 
Turkey 0.66 0.37 0.45 0.85 0.46 0.49 
Ukraine 0.92 0.25 0.27 0.95 0.86 0.14 
Mean 0.71*** 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.85 0.38*** 0.43 
Sd 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.26 0.28 
Developed Countries       
Australia 0.38 0.90 0.61 0.51 0.21 0.71 
Austria 0.11 0.55 0.79 0.70 0.60 0.63 
Belgium 0.65 0.75 0.54 0.94 0.82 0.57 
Canada 0.39 0.80 0.52 0.48 0.36 0.68 
Czech Republic 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.74 0.70 0.29 
Denmark 0.18 0.74 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.70 
Finland 0.33 0.63 0.26 0.59 0.38 0.57 
France 0.68 0.71 0.43 0.86 0.63 0.48 
Germany 0.35 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.83 0.40 
Greece 0.60 0.35 0.57 1.00 0.45 0.50 
Hong Kong 0.68 0.25 0.57 0.29 0.61 0.17 
Ireland 0.28 0.70 0.68 0.35 0.24 0.65 
Italy 0.50 0.76 0.70 0.75 0.61 0.30 
Luxembourg 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.64 0.56 
Netherlands 0.38 0.80 0.14 0.53 0.67 0.68 
New Zealand 0.22 0.79 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.75 
Norway 0.31 0.69 0.08 0.50 0.35 0.55 
Portugal 0.63 0.27 0.31 0.99 0.28 0.33 
Slovenia 0.71 0.27 0.19 0.88 0.49 0.48 
Spain 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.86 0.48 0.44 
Sweden 0.31 0.71 0.05 0.29 0.53 0.78 
United Kingdom 0.35 0.89 0.66 0.35 0.51 0.69 
Mean 0.44*** 0.63*** 0.45*** 0.62 0.50*** 0.54 
SD 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.17 
UNCER, INDIV, POWER, MASC, LONG, and INDUL represent uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, 
masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence, respectively, according to Hofstede (2011) cultural dimensions. 




Table VI. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Emerging Countries       
AEM  6,313  0.0635*** 0.0425 0.0644 0.4720 0.0001 
REM  4,965  0.0022*** 0.0265 0.2967 1.0495 -1.3477 
SIZE  6,313  20.5408*** 20.4812 1.9290 25.4383 14.0834 
ROA  6,313  0.0277*** 0.0378 0.1324 0.3083 -1.7641 
LEVERAGE  6,313  0.5572*** 0.5403 0.2546 1.9795 0.0226 
GROWTH  6,313  0.1131 0.0733 0.3792 3.9868 -0.8911 
LOSS  6,313  0.2047*** - - - - 
BIG4  6,313  0.7005*** - - - - 
Developed Countries       
AEM  27,605  0.0571*** 0.0357 0.0635 0.4720 0.0000 
REM  17,826  -0.0590*** -0.0180 0.4006 1.0495 -1.3477 
SIZE  27,605  20.2884*** 20.1249 2.2763 25.4383 14.0834 
ROA  27,605  -0.0118*** 0.0312 0.2152 0.3083 -1.7641 
LEVERAGE  27,605  0.5741*** 0.5736 0.2616 1.9795 0.0226 
GROWTH  27,605  0.1127 0.0472 0.5128 3.9868 -0.8911 
LOSS  27,605  0.2811*** - - - - 
BIG4  27,605  0.7589*** - - - - 
AEM represents the accruals-based earnings management proxy calculated based on Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. REM represents the real 
earnings management proxy calculated based on Roychowdhury (2006). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the net income 
divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is the total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH is the percentage growth of net sales from the 
year. LOSS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations with negative net income and zero otherwise. BIG4 is a 
dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations audited by PwC, KPMG, E&Y, or Deloitte, and zero otherwise. 




Table VII. Correlation matrix 
Emerging Countries 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. AEM —              
2. REM 0.0647*** —             
3. UNC 0.0551*** -0.0416** —            
4. INDIV 0.1003*** 0.0115 0.4487*** —           
5. POWER -0.0404** -0.0928*** 0.2452*** -0.0451*** —          
6. MASC 0.0518*** -0.0225 0.0952*** 0.7017*** -0.0214*** —         
7. LONG 0.0212*** -0.0003 0.2956*** 0.0815*** 0.7001*** -0.3461*** —        
8. INDUL -0.0960*** -0.0131 -0.6490*** -0.6133*** -0.2091*** -0.0378*** -0.5441*** —       
9. SIZE -0.2376*** -0.0338** -0.3166*** -0.3460*** 0.2335*** -0.2095*** 0.1195*** 0.2663*** —      
10. ROA -0.1161*** -0.4098*** 0.0115 -0.0360*** -0.0270** -0.0357*** -0.0271** 0.0150 0.1134*** —     
11. LEVERAGE 0.0920* 0.2065*** -0.1415*** -0.0666*** 0.0472*** -0.0379*** 0.0571*** 0.0656*** 0.1257*** -0.4890*** —    
12. GROWTH 0.0817*** -0.0313** 0.0318** 0.0226* -0.0560*** -0.0091 0.0083 -0.0278** -0.0102 0.0992*** 0.0006 —   
13. GDP -0.0176 -0.0222 0.2251*** 0.2576*** -0.2773*** 0.0213*** -0.0749*** 0.0703*** -0.1103*** 0.0190 -0.0671*** -0.0069 —  











Table VII. (continued) 
 
Developed Countries 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. AEM — 
           
  
2. REM 0.0874*** — 
          
  
3. UNC -0.0646*** 0.0026 — 
         
  
4. INDIV 0.0334*** -0.0405*** -0.4803*** — 
        
  
5. POWER -0.0210*** 0.0381*** 0.7098*** -0.3889*** — 
       
  
6. MASC 0.0433*** 0.0466*** 0.1643*** 0.1377*** 0.0511*** — 
      
  
7. LONG -0.0551*** -0.0575*** 0.3088*** -0.0587*** 0.1903*** 0.2737*** —        
8. INDUL 0.0371*** 0.0438*** -0.5977*** 0.5648*** -0.5300*** -0.3343*** -0.4655*** —       
9. SIZE -0.3200*** -0.0191** 0.1409*** -0.1146*** 0.0946*** -0.0551*** 0.1014*** -0.1484*** — 
   
  
10. ROA -0.2928*** -0.3508*** 0.0720*** -0.0965*** 0.0420*** -0.0589*** 0.1176*** -0.0920*** 0.3374*** — 
  
  
11. LEVERAGE 0.0446*** 0.1635*** 0.1487*** -0.0850*** 0.0983*** 0.0111* 0.0619*** -0.1221*** 0.1600*** -0.2459*** —    
12. GROWTH 0.1542*** -0.0219*** -0.0862*** 0.0739*** -0.0488*** 0.0192*** -0.0556*** 0.0641*** -0.0741*** 0.0135** -0.0768*** —   
13. GDP 0.0157*** -0.0473*** -0.5108*** 0.4251*** -0.5335*** -0.3670*** -0.1258*** 0.4416*** -0.0319*** -0.0322*** -0.0950*** 0.0508*** —  
14. RULE OF LAW 0.0434*** 0.0055 -0.6436*** 0.3448*** -0.5719*** -0.3470*** -0.1171*** 0.5990*** -0.0859*** -0.0338*** -0.1326*** 0.0626*** 0.6790*** — 
UNC, INDIV, POWER, MASC, LONG, and INDUL represent uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence, respectively, according to Hofstede (2011) cultural 
dimensions. AEM represents the accruals-based earnings management proxy calculated based on Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. REM represents the real earnings management proxy calculated based on Roychowdhury 
(2006). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is the total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH is the percentage growth of net sales from the year. 
GDP is natural logarithm of GDP per capita of each country-year. RULE OF LAW is the index of law enforcement for each country-year. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year observations for emerging 
(developed) countries. 
 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table VIII. Effect of national culture on accruals-based earnings management  































Constant 0.251*** 0.216***  0.213*** 0.102***  0.235*** 0.194***  0.218*** 0.226***  0.239*** 0.240***  0.224*** 0.248*** 
 (6.10) (9.93)  (5.84) (3.91)  (6.54) (8.72)  (6.10) (10.55)  (6.54) (11.02)  (6.24) (11.57) 
CULTURE -0.020 0.002  -0.011* -0.026***  -0.027*** 0.013***  -0.025*** 0.009***  0.011* 0.011***  -0.001 -0.030*** 
 (-1.29) (1.21)  (-1.62) (-7.74)  (-2.80) (4.46)  (-4.00) (4.65)  (1.90) (4.32)  (-0.21) (-10.38) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.004***  -0.005*** -0.004***  -0.005*** -0.004***  -0.005*** -0.004***  -0.005*** -0.004***  -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (-9.85) (-19.32)  (-9.77) (-19.91)  (-9.45) (-19.55)  (-10.14) (-19.34)  (-9.67) (-19.72)  (-9.53) (-19.99) 
ROA -0.015** -0.035***  -0.015** -0.035***  -0.017** -0.035***  -0.016** -0.035***  -0.014* -0.035***  -0.014* -0.035*** 
 (-1.98) (-16.52)  (-2.00) (-16.46)  (-2.27) (-16.37)  (-2.16) (-16.53)  (-1.92) (-16.71)  (-1.94) (-16.47) 
LEVERAGE 0.025*** 0.005***  0.025*** 0.004***  0.024*** 0.005***  0.024*** 0.005***  0.025*** 0.005***  0.025*** 0.005*** 
 (7.05) (3.36)  (7.09) (3.06)  (6.67) (3.42)  (6.86) (3.77)  (7.20) (3.51)  (7.16) (3.30) 
GROWTH 0.015*** 0.015***  0.015*** 0.014***  0.015*** 0.015***  0.015*** 0.014***  0.015*** 0.015***  0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (6.04) (18.80)  (6.07) (18.45)  (6.10) (18.81)  (5.98) (18.46)  (6.10) (18.88)  (6.10) (18.44) 
LOSS 0.000 0.005***  0.000 0.005***  -0.000 0.005***  -0.000 0.005***  0.000 0.005***  0.000 0.006*** 
 (0.03) (5.78)  (0.05) (5.71)  (-0.03) (5.83)  (-0.10) (5.60)  (0.07) (5.79)  (0.07) (5.85) 
BIG FOUR 0.002 0.001  0.002 0.002***  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.003 0.002*  0.002 0.002** 
 (1.16) (1.19)  (1.03) (2.64)  (1.46) (1.37)  (1.27) (1.53)  (1.54) (1.77)  (1.29) (2.35) 
GDP 0.002 -0.003*  -0.000 0.003*  -0.002 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002  -0.002 -0.004**  -0.001 -0.003* 
 (0.52) (-1.83)  (-0.03) (1.77)  (-0.45) (-0.86)  (-0.14) (-1.21)  (-0.40) (-2.19)  (-0.29) (-1.92) 
RULE OF LAW -0.011*** 0.002**  -0.009*** 0.002  -0.010*** 0.003***  -0.010*** 0.003**  -0.008*** 0.002*  -0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (-4.27) (1.99)  (-3.95) (1.57)  (-4.52) (2.92)  (-4.36) (2.53)  (-3.70) (1.89)  (-4.01) (6.13) 
CRISE -0.014 -0.008***  -0.015 -0.009***  -0.014 -0.008***  -0.015 -0.008***  -0.014 -0.008***  -0.014 -0.008*** 
 (-1.53) (-4.60)  (-1.59) (-5.23)  (-1.56) (-4.65)  (-1.61) (-4.60)  (-1.50) (-4.48)  (-1.56) (-4.41) 
                  
Diff. Culture (A) - (B) -   0.015*   -0.040***   -0.034***   0.001   -  
 -   [3.65]   [13.95]   [29.95]   [0.01]   -  
Test F 41.73*** 243.60***  41.82*** 244.90***  41.55*** 244.30***  42.24*** 244.40***  41.90*** 243.00***  41.76*** 246.90*** 
R2 0.1754 0.2204   0.1757 0.2214   0.1747 0.2210   0.1772 0.2210   0.1760 0.2200   0.1755 0.2227 
Dependent variable is AEM, the absolute discretionary accruals calculated based on Kothari et al. (2005). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is the 
total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH is the percentage growth of net sales from the year. LOSS is dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations with negative net income and zero otherwise. 
BIG4 is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations audited by PwC, KPMG, E&Y, or Deloitte, and zero otherwise. GDP is natural logarithm of GDP per capita of each country-year. RULE OF 
LAW is the index of law enforcement for each country-year. CRISIS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for 2007, 2008, and 2009, and zero otherwise. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year observations 
for emerging (developed) countries, excluding those with studentized residuals greater than 3, by default. Continuous firm-level variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% tail in order to avoid outliers (Cox, 2006). All 
models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the first-step regressions concerning AEM are included in all estimations (Chen et al., 2018). χ2 Hausman 
test on the difference of national culture variables coefficient (CULTURE) between emerging and developed countries in brackets (see, e.g., Weesie, 2000). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table IX. Effect of national culture on real earnings management  




























































































































































































































































































                  
Diff. Culture (A) - (B) -0.244***   -   -0.435***   -   0.078**   -  
 [9.70]   -   [69.56]   -   [5.72]   -  
                  
Test F 56.36*** 154.30***  55.54*** 154.40***  58.48*** 154.60***  55.75*** 153.70***  55.62*** 155.30***  55.54*** 155.10*** 
R2 0.2739 0.2212   0.2710 0.2213   0.2813 0.2216   0.2718 0.2204   0.2713 0.2223   0.2710 0.2221 
Dependent variable is REM, the real earnings management proxy calculated based on Roychowdhury (2006). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. LEVERAGE 
is the total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH is the percentage growth of net sales from the year. LOSS is dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations with negative net income and zero 
otherwise. BIG4 is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for company-year observations audited by PwC, KPMG, E&Y, or Deloitte, and zero otherwise. GDP is natural logarithm of GDP per capita of each country-year. 
RULE OF LAW is the index of law enforcement for each country-year. CRISIS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for 2007, 2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year 
observations for emerging (developed) countries, excluding those with studentized residuals greater than 3, by default. Continuous firm-level variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% tail in order to avoid outliers 
(Cox, 2006). All models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the first-step regressions concerning REM are included in all estimations (Chen et al., 
2018). χ2 Hausman test on the difference of national culture variables coefficient (CULTURE) between emerging and developed countries in brackets (see, e.g., Weesie, 2000). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table X. Robustness test: Effect of national culture on accruals-based earnings management 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management – Larcker and Richardson (2004) 











































































Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 30.99*** 163.50*** 30.98*** 166.10*** 31.37*** 164.20*** 31.40*** 164.20*** 30.75*** 163.90*** 30.76*** 167.90*** 











Accruals-Based Earnings Management – Dechow et al. (2012) 











































































Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 31.19*** 144.90*** 31.05*** 147.30*** 31.82*** 145.60*** 31.30*** 145.70*** 31.02*** 145.30*** 31.03*** 149.20*** 











Dependent variables are alternative variables for accruals-based earnings management based on Larcker and Richardson (2004) and Dechow et al. (2012) for Panel A and B, respectively. Control variables are 
inserted in all estimations. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year observations for emerging (developed) countries, excluding those with studentized residuals greater than 3, by default. Continuous 
firm-level variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% tail in order to avoid outliers (Cox, 2006). All models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the 
first-step regressions concerning AEM are included in all estimations (Chen et al., 2018). 




Table XI. Robustness test: Effect of national culture on real earnings management 
Real Earnings Management – Sum of Abnormal Levels of Productions Costs and Discretionary Expenses 











































































Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 12.89*** 32.79*** 12.35*** 32.23*** 14.81*** 32.51*** 12.38*** 33.52*** 12.44*** 34.27*** 12.34*** 33.75*** 











Real Earnings Management – Sum of Abnormal Levels of Cash Flows from Operations and Discretionary Expenses 











































































Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 113.40*** 300.90*** 113.00*** 301.50*** 113.70*** 301.70*** 113.90*** 298.10*** 113.30*** 302.90*** 113.40*** 302.70*** 











Dependent variable are alternative variables for real earnings management based on Roychowdhury (2006). Control variables are inserted in all estimations. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year 
observations for emerging (developed) countries, excluded those with studentized residuals greater than three, by default. Continuous firm-level variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% tail in order to avoid 
outliers (Cox, 2006). All models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the first-step regressions concerning REM are included in all estimations (Chen 
et al., 2018). 




Table XII. Effect of national culture on earnings management: The role of enforcement 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management 











































































CULTURE x Enforcement -0.086*** 0.014***  -0.088*** 0.014**  -0.170** 0.040***  0.002 -0.002  0.148** -0.013**  0.029*** -0.003 
 (-2.69) (3.08)  (-4.35) (2.38)  (-2.52) (5.24)  (0.18) (-0.42)  (2.50) (-2.56)  (3.42) (-0.58) 
Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 39.58 230.4 40.07 231.1 39.38 231.4 39.77 230.9 39.77 229.5 39.81 232.6 











Real Earnings Management 











































































CULTURE x Enforcement 0.319** 0.107***  0.226** 0.135***  -0.241 0.459***  0.081 0.014  1.766*** 0.133***  -0.045 -0.182*** 
 (2.29) (3.34)  (2.52) (3.48)  (-0.81) (8.56)  (1.32) (0.38)  (7.74) (3.88)  (-1.18) (-4.59) 
Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 53.50 146 52.66 146.2 55.39 148.8 52.66 145.1 54.83 146.9 52.45 147.1 











In Panel A, the dependent variable is AEM, the absolute discretionary accruals calculated based on Kothari et al. (2005). In Panel B, the dependent variable is REM, the real earnings management proxy calculated based on 
Roychowdhury (2006). Enforcement is a dummy which assumes 1 for observations that the RULE OF LAW value is greater than its median, and zero otherwise. Control variables are inserted in all estimations. Overall 
statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year observations for emerging (developed) countries, excluding those with studentized residuals greater than 3, by default. Continuous firm-level variables were winsorized at 1% 
and 99% tail in order to avoid outliers (Cox, 2006). All models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the first-step regressions concerning AEM and REM are 
included in all estimations, according to Chen et al. (2018). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table XIII. Effect of national culture on earnings management: The role of corruption 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management 











































































CULTURE x Corruption 0.111*** -0.018***  0.073*** 0.000  0.053 -0.029***  -0.012 -0.018***  -0.099*** 0.001  -0.028*** 0.020*** 
 (3.97) (-4.31)  (3.65) (0.02)  (0.85) (-3.84)  (-0.86) (-3.84)  (-2.84) (0.11)  (-3.25) (3.89) 
Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 40.78 236.80 40.77 237.40 39.98 237.50 40.62 237.40 40.84 235.60 40.73 238.80 











Real Earnings Management 











































































CULTURE x Corruption -0.400*** -0.112***  -0.095 -0.310***  0.468* -0.316***  -0.022 -0.126***  -0.363** -0.063*  0.015 0.040 
 (-3.36) (-3.57)  (-1.08) (-7.96)  (1.68) (-5.85)  (-0.36) (-3.60)  (-2.30) (-1.78)  (0.40) (1.12) 
Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
                  
                  
Test F 54.92 148.80 52.81 149.70 56.73 148.60 53.01 146.80 53.16 148.30 52.84 149.7 











In Panel A, the dependent variable is AEM, the absolute discretionary accruals calculated based on Kothari et al. (2005). In Panel B, the dependent variable is REM, the real earnings management proxy calculated based on 
Roychowdhury (2006). Corruption is a dummy which assumes 1 for observations that the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index is lower than its median, and zero otherwise. Control variables are 
inserted in all estimations. Overall statistics based on 6,313 (27,605) firm-year observations for emerging (developed) countries, excluding those with studentized residuals greater than 3, by default. Continuous firm-level 
variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% tail in order to avoid outliers (Cox, 2006). All models are estimated by using OLS approach, controlling for industry-, year-fixed effects. The regressors of the first-step regressions 
concerning AEM and REM are included in all estimations, according to Chen et al., (2018). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
